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Abstract
We revisit the question of whether a refund increases e¢ ciency in threshold public
good games. New experimental evidence is presented on the e¤ect of endowment size.
We demonstrate that a refund increases e¢ ciency if and only if the endowment is small
relative to the threshold. We also propose a novel way to analyze the e¤ect of a refund.
Specically, we argue that a refund increases e¢ ciency only if signicantly many groups
converge towards zero contributions in the absence of a refund.
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1 Introduction
Many public goods can be categorized as threshold public goods in the sense that the
good is provided if and only if total contributions reach some critical threshold (Taylor
and Ward 1982, Hampton 1987). Experimental evidence suggests considerable ine¢ ciency
in providing such goods (Croson and Marks 2000). The literature has, therefore, focussed
on institutions that can improve e¢ ciency such as voting (Rauchdobler, Sausgruber and
Tyran 2010) and a membership fee (Bchir and Willinger 2013).
The institution that has arguably received most attention is that of a refund. Evidence
on the e¤ect of refunds is, however, inconclusive. To illustrate, Table 1 (that we shall revisit
in the subsequent analysis) details the success rate at providing public goods in all studies
that allow direct comparison of treatments with and without a refund.1 In many cases
the refund makes little di¤erence (Isaac, Schmidtz and Walker 1989, Cadsby and Maynes
1999). Moreover, in those where it does the di¤erence is statistically insignicant (with
one exception).2 This insignicance cannot be easily dismissed as due to lack of statistical
power because the groups most successful at providing the public good are often observed
when there is no refund (Coats, Gronberg and Grosskopf 2009).
If a refund only works in certain situations then it is essential to know what these are
(Cadsby and Maynes 1999), particularly if refunds would be costly to implement. In this
paper we demonstrate that the endowment of players is critical. Combining this insight
with those of Isaac et al. (1989) and Cadsby and Maynes (1999) we show that a refund
enhances e¢ ciency if and only if endowments are small relative to the threshold. We also
propose a general approach to studying the e¤ect of refunds that builds on Isaac et al.
(1989). A refund is posited to enhance e¢ ciency only if many groups would converge on
zero contributions in the absence of a refund. We feel that these combined insights provide
a clear and persuasive story of when a refund makes a di¤erence.
We proceed as follows: In Section 2 we introduce notation, in Section 3 we describe our
experimental design, in Section 4 we provide our main results and in Section 5 we conclude.
Experiment instructions are provided in an appendix.
1We restrict attention to simltaneous, continuous choice threshold public good games. (Note that Isaac
et al. (1989) have a form of rebate if contributions are above the threshold and Coats et al. (2009) use
stranger matching.) For results with sequential choice see Coats et al. (2009). For results with binary
choice see Dawes et al. (1986) and Rapoport and Eshed Levy (1989).
2Table 1 also details our results, to be discussed below, where we also observe a statistically signicant
di¤erence.
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Table 1: Observed success rates at providing the public good in studies that compare the
e¤ect of a refund with no refund. As will be dened in section 2, T is threshold, V is
the value of the public good, and E is endowment. The number of independent groups or
cohorts is given in brackets. We also detail the step return (SR) and endowment multiple
(EM), dened in Section 4. * indicates a signicant di¤erence at the 10% level and ** at
the 5% level.
Paper Game Success rates (%) SR EM
No refund Refund Di¤erence
Coats et al.
(2009)
Simultaneous 26.1 (3) 46.7 (3) 20.6 2.0 1.7
Isaac et al. Low T 35.0 (6) 41.7 (6) 6.67 1.2 2.3
(1989) Medium T 26.7 (6) 53.3 (6) 26.67 1.2 1.2
High T 15.0 (6) 56.7 (6) 41.67* 1.2 1.0
Cadsby T = 25; V = 5 7.7 (2) 16.0 (1) 8.3 2.0 4.0
and Maynes T = 25; V = 20 64.1 (2) 56.4 (2) -7.7 8.0 4.0
(1999) T = 50; V = 7:5 0.0 (2) 28.0 (1) 28.0 1.5 2.0
T = 50; V = 11 12.0 (3) 20.0 (1) 8.0 2.2 2.0
T = 50; V = 20 20.3 (3) 44.0 (1) 23.7 4.0 2.0
T = 50; V = 30 24.0 (2) 60.0 (1) 36.0 6.0 2.0
T = 75; V = 10 8.0 (1) 10.0 (2) 2.0 1.3 1.3
T = 75; V = 22:5 0.0 (1) 40.0 (1) 40.0 3.0 1.3
T = 75; V = 32:5 16.0 (1) 36.0 (1) 20.0 4.3 1.3
Our results High E 61.1 (9) 64.7 (6) -2.4 2.0 2.8
Baseline E 49.5 (8) 55.0 (8) 5.5 2.0 2.2
Low E 16.4 (9) 61.3 (6) 44.9** 2.0 1.2
2 Notation
A symmetric threshold public good game is characterized by four integers: the number of
players n, size of endowment E, threshold T < nE, and value of the public good V > E.
Each player is endowed with E units of a private good. Simultaneously, players decide how
much of their endowment to contribute towards a public good. For each player i = 1; n,
let xi 2 f0; 1; :::; Eg denote the contribution of player i. A contribution prole (x1; :::; xn)
lists the contribution of each player. Let Y =
Pn
j=1 xj denote total contributions and let
Y i = Y   xi.
In the case of refund the payo¤ function of player i = 1; n can be written
i(xi; Y i) =

E   xi + V if xi + Y i  T
E if xi + Y i < T
:
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Thus, if total contributions equal or exceed the threshold T then the public good is provided
and each player receives an additional V units of private good. If total contributions are
less than the threshold then the public good is not provided and each player receives a
refund.3 In the case of no refund the payo¤ function of player i = 1; n can be written
i(xi; Y i) =

E   xi + V if xi + Y i  T
E   xi if xi + Y i < T
:
2.1 Nash Equilibria
Contribution prole (x1; :::; x






 i) > i(xi; Y

 i) for all xi 2 f0; 1; :::; Eg; xi 6= xi and all i = 1; n. In order to
characterize the set of Nash equilibria let  denote the set of contribution proles where
(x1; :::; xn) 2  if and only if X
i2N
xi = T and max
i2N
fxig < V:
In the case of refund the set of strict Nash equilibria is given by . Thus, any strict Nash
equilibrium results in the public good being provided (Bagnoli and Lipman 1989).4
In the case of no refund (when T > min fE; V g) there is an additional strict Nash
equilibrium; the absence of a refund means that player i strictly prefers contributing 0 if
others contribute 0. Thus, the set of strict Nash equilibria consists of  plus the zero vector
(0; :::; 0). This results in an assurance problem (Isaac et al. 1989); essentially, a player will
contribute, in the absence of a refund, only if he expects others to contribute.
3 Experiment design
We look at six treatments corresponding to six games, as summarized in Table 2. The
Baseline treatment corresponds to a baseline treatment used in the literature (Croson
and Marks 2000, Cadsby et al. 2008). The High and Low treatments are motivated and
discussed by Alberti and Cartwright (2015). The name High or Low refers to a relatively
high or low endowment. To consider the e¤ects of no refund we have three matching NR
treatments.
In explaining our experimental design it is important to clarify the di¤erences in our
objective and design to that of Alberti and Cartwright (2015). The objective of Alberti
and Cartwright (2015) was to study the e¤ect of endowment size in games with a refund.
As such, they analyzed the High, Baseline and Low treatments (plus two other treatments
not reported here). By contrast, our objective is to analyze the e¤ect of a refund. Hence,
3We shall assume that if total contributions are above the threshold there is no rebate of the excess
contributions. This is standard in the literature, e.g. Cadsby et al. (2008).
4 If T > min fE; V g there is also a set of non-strict Nash equilibria with no public good provision.
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we compare treatments with and without a refund.5 This also allows insight on the e¤ect
of endowment size in games without a refund.
Table 2: A summary of the experimental treatments. (The three refund treatments are re-
ported by Alberti and Cartwright (2015). The three no refund treatments are not reported
elsewhere.)
Treatment n E V T Refund No. of groups
High NR 5 70 50 125 No 9
High 5 70 50 125 Yes 6
Baseline NR 5 55 50 125 No 8
Baseline 5 55 50 125 Yes 8
Low NR 5 30 50 125 No 9
Low 5 30 50 125 Yes 6
The subjects in each experimental session were randomly assigned to a group of 5,
assigned a treatment, and then played the relevant threshold public good game for 25
periods (with a xed matching protocol). At the end of each period feedback was given on
own payo¤, total contributions to the public good and whether or not the public good was
provided. A total of 230 subjects took part. The experiment was run at the University
of Kent (United Kingdom) with subjects recruited from the student population. The
experiments were computerized, using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The average payment
was £ 10.25 and an experimental session lasted about 45 minutes.
4 Experimental results
In Figure 1 we plot the average success rate over time for each of the 6 treatments (see
also Table 1). Only in the case of a low endowment does the presence of a refund make
a signicant di¤erence to overall success (Mann-Whitney test of group success over 25
periods, p = 0:02 for low, p = 0:92 for baseline, and p = 0:81 for high).6 There is,
however, evidence of a dynamic di¤erence in the case of a high endowment. Specically,
the success rate declines over time in the High NR treatment while it increases over time in
the High treatment (Mann-Whitney test of change in group success between rst 5 and last
5 periods, p = 0:03). In the case of a low endowment the success rate increases over time
in both treatments but increases signicantly more in the Low than Low NR treatment
(p = 0:03).7
5To be clear, the data we use for the refund treatments is the same as that reported by Alberti and
Cartwright (2015). The data from the matching no refund treatments has not been reported elsewhere (but
was collected as part of the same experiment).
6Success over periods 1 to 5 gives p < 0:01 for low, p = 0:45 for baseline and p = 0:16 for high. Success
over periods 21 to 25 gives p = 0:04 for low, p = 0:67 and p = 0:76 for high.
7There is no evidence of any dynamic di¤erences in the baseline treatment (p = 0:48).
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Figure 1: Average success rate across the 25 periods distinguishing by treatment.
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We next look for evidence of convergence towards Nash equilibrium. Specically, we
look at absolute deviation in total contributions from the nearestNash equilibrium, mea-
sured by min fY; jY   T jg. Figure 2 plots the absolute deviation over time for the 6 treat-
ments. The absolute deviation is signicantly declining over time in all treatments except
Baseline NR (Mann-Whitney test of group deviation in rst 5 periods versus last 5 periods,
p = 0:53 for Baseline NR, p = 0:06 for High NR, and p < 0:05 for all other treatments).
Only in the case of a low endowment does the presence of a refund make a signicant
di¤erence (p = 0:02 for low, p = 0:10 for baseline, and p = 0:32 for high).
4.1 Endowment multiple
In summary, the presence of a refund makes a signicant di¤erence in the case of a low
endowment but no or little di¤erence otherwise. Previous studies (see Table 1) have shown
that a refund increases e¢ ciency when there is a high threshold (Isaac et al. 1989, Cadsby
and Maynes 1999). But the threshold can be highrelative to: (i) the value of the public












Table 1 details the SR and EM for the games considered in the literature.8 At rst
glance EM seems a good indicator of whether a refund will increase e¢ ciency. To formally
test this we regressed the di¤erence in success rate between the refund and no refund treat-
ments (weighting according to the number of groups) against SR and EM. The coe¢ cient on
SR is insignicant (2:95; p = 0:18) but that on EM is highly signicant ( 20:1; p < 0:001).
From this we conclude that the presence of a refund increases e¢ ciency if and only if T
is high relative to E; there is no evidence that V matters. We provide an explanation for
this in the next sub-section.
8The literature has also considered the net reward V   T
n
and endowment remainder E  T
n
(Cadsby and
Maynes 1999, Alberti and Cartwright 2015). We use the step return and endowment multiple here because
they are unit free and so make comparison across studies easier.
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Figure 2: Absolute deviation from Nash equilibrium across the 25 periods distinguishing
by treatment.
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4.2 Positive and zero groups
We now propose a general approach that can identify when a refund increases e¢ ciency.
Recall that the absence of a refund results in an extra strict Nash equilibrium - the
zero vector (0; :::; 0). If a group converges on zero contributions then the success rate
at providing the public good will clearly be low. This is the essence of the assurance
problem (Isaac et al. 1989). In the presence of a refund there is no reason to expect zero
contributions. We conjecture, therefore, that any di¤erence in outcome because of a refund
is primarily caused by signicantly many groups converging on zero contributions in the
absence of a refund.9
In assessing this conjecture we rst remind that the absolute deviation from Nash
equilibrium decreased over time suggesting convergence towards Nash equilibrium. Suppose
we distinguish between positive and zero groups depending on whether play converges
towards set  or (0; :::0). In practice, we classied a group as positive if Y > T=2 in each
of the last ve periods and as a zero group if Y < T=2 in each of the last ve periods. As
summarized in Table 3, this allowed us to classify 43 out of 46 groups.
As expected, zero groups are only observed with no refund. Consistent with our conjec-
ture, the proportion of zero groups in the Low NR treatment is signicantly above that in
the High NR (p = 0:09, LR test) and Baseline NR (p = 0:05) treatments. Table 4 provides
summary statistics on outcomes in positive groups. As conjectured, in positive groups
di¤erences in success rate (p > 0:20), the dynamics of success (p > 0:11), and absolute
deviation from Nash equilibrium (p > 0:22) are all insignicant (in the high, baseline and
low treatments).
Table 3: The number of groups classied as zero or positive groups by treatment.
Treatment Zero Positive Unclassied
High NR 2 6 1
High 0 6 0
Baseline NR 1 6 1
Baseline 0 8 0
Low NR 6 2 1
Low 0 6 0
9Some di¤erences may still remain. For instance, Alberti, Cartwright and Stepanova (2013) predict a
higher success rate when there is no refund in, what we shall shortly call, positive groups (groups that do
not converge on (0; :::; 0)). The di¤erences, however, are predicted to be relatively small.
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Table 4: Success rate and absolution deviation from Nash equilibrium in positive groups.
Treatment Success (%) Deviation
1 to 25 21 to 25 1 to 25 21 to 25
High NR 80 83 19:19 12:10
High 65 77 12:82 4:17
Baseline NR 66 60 15:52 13:10
Baseline 55 53 11:91 11:05
Low NR 70 100 11:04 0:00
Low 61 73 7:13 4:20
All the evidence supports the idea that one can predict whether a refund will make
a di¤erence by predicting the likelihood of zero groups. This line of reasoning is useful
because, as we discuss shortly, the literature can give insight on the likelihood of zero
groups. One thing the literature had neglected is the e¤ect of relative endowment size. Our
results provide strong evidence that a relatively small endowment amplies the assurance
problem. An explanation for this is that the smaller is E relatively to T then the less
a¤ordable it is for a player to contribute. Put di¤erently, the higher is the risk from
contributing. This may decrease willingness to contribute. Moreover, it may decrease
expectations that others will contribute.
5 Conclusion
We have provided new experimental evidence on whether the presence of a refund in-
creases e¢ ciency in threshold public good games. We demonstrate that a refund increases
e¢ ciency only if endowments are low relative to the threshold. A refund, particularly if
costly to implement, may, therefore, be inappropriate. This is where our proposed dis-
tinction between zero and positive groups proves useful. Wherever convergence on zero
contributions is likely to prevail we argue that a refund will make a di¤erence. In this
paper we have demonstrated that zero contributions are likely to prevail if the endowment
is low relative to the threshold. Other factors may also prove important. For example,
Cadsby and Maynes (1998) nd that economics and business students are more likely to
converge on zero contributions than nurses. Similarly, inequality in endowments has been
shown to exasperate the assurance problem (e.g. Tavoni et al. 2011).
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